A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE CONCEPT OF “CONSCIOUSNESS” IN CONTEMPORARY ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE METHODOLOGY
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31108/3.2025.9.7Abstract
The article examines contemporary approaches to certain methodological, psychological, and philosophical issues in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) as a scientific discipline. In particular, it offers a critical analysis of concepts such as artificial consciousness, artificial personality, strong and weak AI, the easy and hard problems of consciousness, the properties of inner sensory experience (qualia), the philosophical zombie, and machine understanding, as presented in the works of H. S. Kostiuk, A. Turing, R. Penrose, D. Lucas, D. Chalmers, D. Hoffman, and J. Searle, who argue against overly simplistic views of consciousness grounded in physicalist reductionism.
From the perspective of proponents of a positive forecast regarding the development of artificial intelligence systems (AI systems), the so-called «strong» (universal) AI may reach a level where it acquires subjectivity—the capacity to think and to be self-aware as a distinct personality (including the ability to understand and be aware of its own thoughts, «inner world», and so on).
In this context, the works of Giulio Tononi, Marcello Massimino, Seth Anil, and futurist Ray Kurzweil are analysed, as they believe that the development of technology can lead to the emergence of a ‘conscious machine’ capable of self-reflection.
Thus, for a comprehensive analysis of the problem of «artificial consciousness» and «subjectivity of AI systems» the issue of consciousness in cyberpsychology (and possibly psychology in general) should receive a new interpretation that will challenge traditional views of consciousness.
However, at the moment, AI systems mainly operate based on the principles of the Turing machine and are viewed more as systems with «weak» (applied or narrow) intelligence. Mathematical and engineering modelling of natural intelligence currently allows cybernetic systems to implement (sometimes quite adequately) only models of individual human cognitive abilities and primary mental operations, i.e. components of natural intelligence. This necessitates using the term «artificial intelligence» with caution and talking more about the modelling of «artificial higher mental functions».
Therefore, for the further development of the theory of «artificial consciousness» it is essential to conduct research on human consciousness using instrumental neurophysiological methods and to develop new professional psychological tests to study the possible «consciousness of the AIS» in order to create ongoing monitoring of the emergence of signs of subjectivity and consciousness in the AIS.
Keywords: cyberpsychology, artificial intelligence methodology, artificial consciousness, strong artificial intelligence, «easy» and «hard» problems of consciousness, physicalist reductionism
Accepted: 15.03.2025
Reviewed: 12.04.2025
Published: 30.04.2025
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Copyright (c) 2025 Shevtsov Andrii Шевцов Андрій Гаррійович

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